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Loftis: Criminal Law: Requiring the Same Intent for Prosecution of Crimin

CRIMINAL LAW: REQUIRING THE SAME INTENT FOR
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPT AND THE
CONSUMMATED CRIME
Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983)
While allegedly intoxicated, petitioner snapped a pistol several
times at his father's head but the weapon failed to fire.1 Consequently, petitioner was convicted 2 of attempted second degree murder.3 On appeal, petitioner argued conviction for attempted second
degree murder requires proof of specific intent and asserted the trial
judge erred by instructing the jury that the prosecution need only
prove a general intent.4 Petitioner further contended this erroneous
instruction deprived him of a voluntary intoxication defense.5 Noting
the completed crime of second degree murder requires only a general
intent, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction,
reasoning the intent necessary to attempt a crime can be no greater7
than the intent necessary to consummate that crime." On certiorari,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, the state is not required to show specific intent to prosecute successfully an attempted
crime where the completed crime itself requires no specific intent.,
Criminal attempts9 were first recognized as punishable under the
ancient maxim, Voluntas reputabiturpro facto-the intention is to
1. Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983). The record does not indicate why the gun
failed to discharge.
2. Gentry v. State, 422 So. 2d 1072, 1072 (2d D.C.A. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.
1983). Samuel Gentry was convicted by jury in the Polk County Circuit Court.
3. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (1983).
4. 422 So. 2d at 1072-73.
5. Id. at 1073. The trial judge "instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication may be a
defense to a crime which required a specific intent. He charged the jury that first-degree murder was a specific intent crime [and that] one could be convicted of second degree murder
without proof of specific intent." Id. at 1072. Petitioner objected to these instructions because
of the implication that voluntary intoxication could be a defense to attempted first degree murder but not to attempted second degree murder. Id.
6. Id. at 1073.
7. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (granting the Florida Supreme Court discretionary
jurisdiction to resolve conflicting district court decisions). The decision in Gentry v. State, 422
So. 2d 1072, 1073 (2d D.C.A. 1982) (holding that "the intent required to attempt to commit a
crime is no greater than the intent necessary to commit the crime itself"), aaf'd, 437 So. 2d 1097
(Fla. 1983) conflicted with the decision in Worthey v. State, 395 So. 2d 1210, 1211 n.3 (Fla.3d
D.C.A. 1981) (holding by way of a footnote that all attempts are necessarily specific intent
crimes, regardless of whether the specific intent is a necessary element of the completed crime).
8. 437 So. 2d at 1099.
9. "Attempt" and "criminal attempt" will be used interchangeably throughout this
Comment.
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be taken for the deed.' 0 Under this doctrine, a definition of attempt
was not necessary." To eliminate arbitrary adjudication, however,
early English courts required the state to prove an unlawful or "general" intent, 2 coupled with an overt act.' 3 As common law developed,
an intent to commit a particular crime, referred to as "specific" in14
tent, became the mental state necessary to constitute an attempt.
Most jurisdictions today follow the common law attempt standard. 1 5 While Florida's attempt statute 6 does not specifically define
attempt, early Florida cases recognized "intent" as a requisite element. 17 Subsequent decisions defined this required mental state in
10. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 560 (2d ed. 1960); W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 59, at 423 (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAvE]. See
generally Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. REV. 821, 821-27 (1928) (history of early English criminal attempts).
11. See Sayre, supra note 10.
12. A general intent is defined as "the intent to do that which the law prohibits. It is not
necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the
precise result which eventuated." BLACK's LAW DICrONARY 727 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). A specific
intent is defined as "the intent necessary to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits." Id. Examples of general intent crimes include: rape, assault, battery, second degree murder. Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1212 n.14 (1955). Examples of specific intent crimes include: larceny (unlawful taking of property with intent to
permanently appropriate), burglary (breaking into a dwelling with intent to commit a crime),
and assault with intent to rape. See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARv.
L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1944).
13. See Rex v. Scofield, Cald 397 (1784). The modern doctrine of criminal attempts may
be traced to Lord Mansfield's statement that: "The intent may make an act, innocent in itself,
criminal; nor is the completion of an act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute criminality."
Id. at 400.
14. See Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 463 (1854) (inebriate must have had a mind
capable of contemplating and intending suicide to be convicted of attempted suicide); Regina v.
Monkhouse, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 55, 56 (1849) (intoxication as defense to wounding with intent to
murder must have prevented restraint or power of forming any specific intention). See also 1 R.
ANDERSON, F. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 73, at 155-56 (1957) (brief discussion of mental state); 2 J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 71(l), at 39 (4th ed. 1896) (brief
discussion of attempt elements). But see J. HALL,supra note 10, at 142 ("To assert ...that an
intention is 'specific' is to employ a superfluous term just as if one were to speak of a 'voluntary
act' "); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW-THE GENERAL PART §21, at 49 (2d ed. 1961) ("The adjective 'specific' seems to be somewhat pointless, for the intent is no more specific than any other
intent required in criminal law"). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955) at 128: "[W]e can see no virtue in preserving the concept of 'general intent,' which
has been an abiding source of ambiguity and confusion in the penal law."
15. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 59, at 425.
16. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (1983). Florida's attempt statute reads in part: "Whoever
attempts to commit an offense prohibited by law and in such attempt does any act toward the
commission of such an offense, but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in
the execution of the same, commits the crime of criminal attempt .. ";FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2)
(1982). Florida's second degree murder statute reads in part: "The unlawful killing of a human
being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved
mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of
any particular individual, is murder in the second degree .... "
17. See Turner v. State, 100 Fla. 1078, 1082, 130 So. 617, 619 (1930) (intent plus overt
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terms of a "particular intent" or an "intent to commit the crime."18
Only recently have Florida courts employed the phrase "specific
intent."' 9
The Florida Supreme Court first intimated a specific intent element for attempts in Gustine v. State.2 0 The court established that
criminal attempt required an intent to commit a crime, coupled with
an overt act "apparently adapted to effect that intent."21 The defendant in Gustine broke into an automobile but was arrested before
starting the engine.2 2 The court reversed the attempted larceny conviction, reasoning that larceny requires an intention to permanently
deprive one of ownership. 23 The court noted the defendant may have
wished only to deprive the owner temporarily. Under such circum24
stances the defendant would not have intended to commit larceny.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal subsequently introduced
specific intent as a necessary element of attempt in Groneau v.
State.25 The district court affirmed a conviction of attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit petty larceny. 2 Relying solely
act); Morton v. State, 72 Fla. 265, 266, 73 So. 187, 187 (1916) (intent plus overt act); Hogan v.
State, 50 Fla. 86, 88, 39 So. 464, 465 (1905) (intent plus overt act).
18. See Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 26, 97 So. 207, 208 (1923) ("intent to commit a crime
coupled with an overt act apparently adapted to effect that intent"); Bunch v. State, 58 Fla. 9,
11, 50 So. 534, 535 (1909) (intent to commit the crime); Taylor v. State, 402 So. 2d 823, 826
(Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (intent to commit that crime); Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595, 596
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972) (intent coupled with overt act apparently adapted to effect that intent).
19. See, e.g., Adams v. Murphy, 394 So. 2d 411, 415 (Fla.1981) (crime of attempted perjury held inconsistent with specific intent); Fleming v. State, 374 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1979) (accidental killing during felony allowed attempted first-degree murder charge); L.J. v. State, 421
So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (crime of attempted sexual battery held consistent with specific intent); Worthey v. State, 395 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (jury instructions
omitting "specific intent to deprive" in robbery definition held harmless); Littles v. State, 384
So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980) (crime of attempted second-degree murder held consistent with specific intent); Hutchinson v. State 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975) (crime
of attempted conspiracy to commit first degree murder held inconsistent with specific intent).
But see Amlotte v. State, 435 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983) (upholding attempted
felony murder conviction); Taylor v. State, 401 So. 2d 812, 816 (Fla.5th D.C.A. 1981) (upholding manslaughter conviction).
20. 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923).
21. Id. at 26, 97 So. at 208. Several decisions use language similar to the "apparently
adapted" test. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972). Accord
Adams v. Murphy, 394 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 1981) ("done towards its commission"); Fleming v.
State, 374 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 1979) ("done towards its commission"); Littles v. State, 384 So.
2d 744, 744 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980) ("done towards its commission").
22. 86 Fla. at 26, 97 So. at 207.
23. Id. at 26, 97 So. at 208.
24. Id. at 28, 97 So. at 208.
25. 201 So. 2d 599, 602 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967).
26. Id. at 604. Defendant was apprehended at 5:00 a.m. hiding beneath a truck. He was in
close proximity to a building containing a screenless broken window with burglary tools nearby.
Id. at 602-03.
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upon Gustine's definition, the Groneau court held that an attempt
requires a "specific intent to commit the crime" and "an overt ineffectual act done towards its commission. 2 7 The intent to carry out a
completed substantive crime must exist; one cannot be convicted of
an attempt to commit a crime that one did not specifically intend to
commit.2 8
The instant district court of appeal,2 9 questioning earlier Florida
courts' assumption that attempts were always specific intent crimes,
refused to follow the Groneau precedent.3 ° The court noted that
neither the Florida attempt statutes' nor the Florida Standard Jury
Instructions 2 includes intent as an element of attempt crimes.3 3 The
court opined that Florida case law had created an anomaly whereby
attempted second degree murder required a specific intent, while the
consummated act of second degree murder required only a general
intent.' 4
The instant case3 5 allowed the Florida Supreme Court to formulate a suitable attempt standard from the conflicting schools of
thought.3 6 In fashioning this standard, the court sought to comply
with the legislative intent behind Florida's attempt statute.37 The instant court embraced the lower court opinion and held that an attempt to commit a crime requires the same intent necessary to prose38
cute the completed crime itself
Rather than citing supportive case law, the instant court based its
holding solely upon public policy grounds. First, the court avowed
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id.
29. 422 So. 2d 1072 (2d D.C.A. 1982), aff'd, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983).
30. Id. at 1072 n.2.
31. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (1983). For the text of this statute see supra note 16.
32. See FLA. STAND. JURY INsTR. IN CRIM. CASES 55 (S. Ct. Comm. 1981). The attempt
provisions provide in part:
[In order to provide that the defendant attempted to commit the crime of (crime
charged), the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:]
1. (Defendant) did some act toward committing the crime of (crime attempted) that
went beyond just thinking or talking about it. 2. He would have committed the crime
except that
[someone prevented him from committing the crime of (crime charged)] [he
failed].
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
attempt
38.

422 So. 2d at 1072 n.2.
Id. at 1073.
437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1982).
See supra note 7.
437 So. 2d at 1099. The court did not elaborate on how its holding comported with the
statute. Id.
Id.
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that the father's life was spared not because the attempt was voluntarily abandoned, but because the gun failed to discharge. 39 The defendant's culpability was not diminished simply because his act
failed due to circumstances beyond his control.4 0 Second, the court
declined to reward such fortuity by imposing upon the prosecution
the added burden of proving a specific, rather than a general intent
to kill. 4 1 In addition, the court maintained that voluntary intoxication never excuses criminal behavior and may only be used to show
the defendant was incapable of entertaining a specific intent.42 Finding attempted second degree murder is only a general intent crime,
the instant court upheld the defendant's conviction.4 3
The instant decision revealed the attempt anomaly perplexing
Florida courts." On the one hand, the Groneau proposition that a
defendant cannot be convicted of a crime he did not specifically intend to commit4 5 appealed to logic. On the other hand, the lower
court pointed out the illogic of requiring the state to prove a greater
intent for an attempted crime than for the completed crime itself.4
Gustine and Groneau, however, both involved attempts to commit specific intent crimes. 47 In cases similar to Gustine and Groneau,
the state must prove a specific intent for both the attempted and the
completed crime. Under the instant facts, however, the Groneau approach bears disparate results. Because second degree murder is a
general intent crime, 48 the successful attempt requires proof of a general intent only, while the unsuccessful attempt requires proof of a
specific intent.
By holding that the intent required for an attempt be the same as
the intent required for the completed crime, the instant court balanced this asymmetry and effectively abated the Groneau specific intent requisite. For attempts to commit general intent crimes, the instant decision reduced the state's burden to the pre-Gustine, early
English benchmark.4 9 Consequently, attempted second degree mur39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. See, e.g., Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 153, 9 So. 835, 845 (1891). See also R
ANDERSON, supra note 14, § 44, at 99 (brief discussion of intoxication affecting legal responsibility); 1 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 400, at 295 (9th ed. 1923) (brief discussion of
intoxication affecting legal responsibility).
43. 437 So. 2d at 1099.
44. Id. at 1098-99. See also 422 So. 2d at 1073.
45. 201 So. 2d at 602. See also supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
46. 422 So. 2d at 1073. See also supra text accompanying note 34.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 23 & 26.
48. See Polk v. State, 179 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965).
49. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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der only requires proof of a general intent coupled with an overt act.
Under this standard, voluntary intoxication would be a defense to
neither second degree murder nor attempted second degree murder.
Because the new standard requires the same intent for the attempt
as is required for the completed crime, however, intoxication will continue to be a defense for all attempted specific intent crimes.50
In effect, the instant decision marks a return to the notion that a
citizen is responsible for his acts, even if he is intoxicated or his attempt is unsuccessful. Under the existing specific/general intent bifurcation, the intoxicated offender who commits first degree murder
is still indictable under the general intent second degree murder
charge.5 1 The instant court found itself in the same position as those
courts originating the specific/general intent dichotomy. 52 Where a
defendant committed a murder while intoxicated, courts found it too
lenient and against public policy to acquit the accused for lack of a
mens rea.5 3 Yet judges were not convinced the inebriate was as culpable as his sober counterpart and should receive the same punishment. 54 These courts created a suitable medium whereby intoxication
would negate the specific intent required for first degree murder, but
would not negate the general intent required for second degree murder. 55 By comparison, if the instant court followed Florida's existing
precedent of requiring a specific intent for all attempts, the defense
of voluntary intoxication would have negated the specific intent requisite, thereby exculpating the defendant. If the court, however, established that all attempts require a general intent, then voluntary
intoxication would never be a defense for any attempt. The court
found a timely middle ground, placing attempts on an equal basis
with those standards governing the completed crime.
The crime of attempt does not exist in a criminal vacuum, but
exists only in relation to the incipient crime. Fair and effective prosecution of criminal attempts necessitates symmetry between the
state's burden of proof and successful or unsuccessful attempts. The
instant court struck a balance by alleviating the prosecution's burden
of proving a specific intent for attempts at general intent crimes. Be50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also J. BIsHoP, supra note 42, § 409
(discussion of intoxication where murder is classified by degrees).
52. See Hall, supra note 12, at 1061 (specific/general intent as a technique of mitigation).
See also Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 306, 308 (1887) (gun fired "vaguely without any
special intent at all" reduces crime to manslaughter); Regina v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox Crim. Cas.
55 (1849) (first use of "specific intention"; considered whether intoxication could be considered
as evidence regarding the intent to murder).
53. See supra note 42 and accompanying text & note 52.
54. Supra note 52.
55. Supra note 52.
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cause the function of criminal law is to protect society, the state must
be able to prosecute successfully, and therefore deter, criminal
attempts. 6
LARRY B. LoFTIs

56. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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